Introduction: a paradox in the critique of positivism
Critiques of positivism abound. It has become near obligatory for self-respecting social scientists to distance themselves from it. This much is obvious to anyone reading the methodological comments of social theorists in the past decade or more. But it is not so obvious precisely what it is that they oppose. I will argue that there is a serious and misleading conflation of several different forms of positivism, that are both logically and (at least partly) historically distinct, in those critiques of positivism associated with the tradition of critical theory stemming from the Frankfurt School.
A concept whose nature will prove especially problematic in this question of 'how many positivisms?' is that of the value-free character of social science supposedly espoused by positivists. "First, drawing on the distinction between discovery and validation, its deductivenomological account of explanation and concomitant modified Humean interpretation of the notion of 'cause'; second, its belief in a neutral observation language as the proper foundation of knowledge; third, its value-free ideal of scientific knowledge; and fourth, its belief in the methodological unity of the sciences." l Likewise, the doctrine of value-freedom (and the associated separation of factual judgements from value-judgements) is ascribed to positivists by Max Horkheimer in his critique of the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle, 'The Latest Attack on Metaphysics' 2 ; by Herbert Marcuse, in his all at once." 7 Here, and throughout Saint-Simon's and Comte's writings, we are presented with the ideal of a society organized upon scientific principles, and in which all social and political problems are open to a rational solution through the application of (social and natural) scientific knowledge. It seems quite clear that, for Weber, this picture is both unattractive and epistemologically indefensible. The philosophical standpoint from which his opposition arises is essentially Kantian, insistent upon the separation of scientific knowledge from the realm of values, freedom, and the will; and this standpoint runs quite contrary to the early positivists' espousal of a scientized society. Yet, of course, we also find a marked antipathy to this 'positivist' ideal in the critical theorists: this much, at least, they have in common with Weber. Indeed, as is often noted, there are significant conceptual parallels between
Weber's analysis of the process of rationalization in modern societies, and the Frankfurt School's critique of instrumental rationality and technological domination.
Thus thinking about Weber presents us with a paradox: the doctrine of value-freedom, typically regarded as a hallmark of positivist social science, seems to have been employed by Weber (quite legitimately, I believe) to reject another doctrine also apparently central to (some) positivists, the scientization of politics -and this latter doctrine is also attacked by critical theorists in their critique of positivism. It is to the resolution of this paradox that much of the rest of this paper will be devoted.
But before proceeding to this, I shall suggest a further indication -though rather less direct -of the same paradoxical situation. This concerns Karl Popper.
In The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, the figures of Popper, and his ally Hans Albert, are taken by the proponents of critical theory (Adorno and Habermas) to represent the positivist position they wish to attack. In the course of these exchanges, Habermas makes it clear that he regards
Popper's espousal of value-freedom, of "the dualism of facts [Tatsachen] and decisions
[Entscheidungen]" 8 as an important aspect of his positivism; and though Popper vehemently resists the label 'positivism' (for good reasons, I believe, mainly related to the issues surrounding what I will later term 'epistemological positivism'), both he and Albert make no concessions on this point: they endorse the doctrine, and reject the dialecticians' attack upon it. 9 So, although value-freedom indicates positivism to the critical theorists, it does not to Popper and Albert.
My attempt to sort out this apparently confusing situation will consist in two stages, one conceptual and the other historical. First, I shall introduce some distinctions between different doctrines that are often termed 'positivist', and outline the logical relations between them (sections 2 and 3). This, I
hope, will show what it is that distinguishes, and indeed renders incompatible, the 'positivist' ideals of value-freedom and the scientization of politics. Second, I shall use these distinctions to help identify some of the important intellectual currents and movements in the history of positivism, such as early French positivism, Utilitarianism, neo-Kantianism, and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (section 4). It will follow from what I say that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as 'the history of positivism'.
'Positivism': some conceptual distinctions
There are four main doctrines that I wish to identify and distinguish here, before proceeding to examine their logical relationships: the 'positivist conception of science'; 'epistemological positivism'; 'the scientization of politics' and 'value-freedom'. I shall suggest that many critics of positivist social science have either failed to note these distinctions, or misunderstood the logical relationships between the items here distinguished.
(1) According to the positivist conception of science, science aims at the explanation and prediction of observable phenomena by presenting these as derivable from general laws that hold in all regions of space and time. Thus the ideal here is the use of science to provide rational solutions to all problems concerning the organization of society. But there is an obvious difficulty for this ideal. For it would seem that scientific knowledge -conceived positivistically, as in (1) above -can only provide us with the ability to make conditional predictions about the consequences of possible courses of action, and cannot prescribe for us the goals or ends of such actions. So a scientific politics must be radically incomplete, until some decision about these goals is provided.
At this point, the attractions of utilitarianism to proponents of the scientization of politics becomes clear. For a central supposed virtue of this doctrine is that, once its basic principle has been adoptedthe 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' -all further normative questions become, in principle, scientifically resolvable. Thus we find that many proponents of a scientific politics have been, to varying degrees of philosophical self-awareness, utilitarians. Strictly speaking, of course, utilitarianism does not constitute a 'purely scientific doctrine of norms', since, as its more sophisticated advocates such as J. S. Mill fully recognized, the principle of utility is not itself scientifically establishable; nor, indeed, according to Mill, can it be given any kind of proof, though he did believe that strong reasons could be provided in support of it. 21 But such problems do not seem to have concerned its less sophisticated supporters, such as Saint-Simon, who contented himself with frequent comments of the following kind:
"It has been recognized that the rulers are only the administrators of society, that they must direct it in conformity with the interests and will of the ruled, and that, in short, the happiness of nations is the sole and exclusive purpose of social organisation." 22 And, "In the present situation it is acknowledged that the permanent and sole duty of governments is to work for the happiness of society. But how is society's happiness to be achieved"
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The answer, for Saint-Simon, lay in the development and application of the 'positive' sciences, both natural and social. In this way, politics (and ethics) could become positive sciences, also.
(4) Just as it is often unclear what positivism consists in, for its critics, so is it unclear what they mean
by the doctrine of value-freedom, which they typically ascribe to positivists. However, it seems reasonable to refer here to Weber's position, since critics of value-freedom frequently point to his work as its classical expression.
As I have argued elsewhere, there are a number of separable elements in Weber's defence of a valuefree social science. 25 First, there is the claim that there is a logical distinction between factual and value-judgements, and that the latter cannot be derived from the former. It follows that science, which is concerned exclusively with facts, cannot establish the truth of value-judgements. Second, Weber argued that whilst values are necessary to orient any social scientific enquiry by giving significance to the task of understanding possible objects of investigation (and, indeed, in conceptualizing those objects via the construction of 'ideal types'), this is their sole function in science. In particular, the criteria for the truth or falsity of scientific descriptions and explanations are logically independent of the acceptance or rejection of substantive normative commitments.
I take these two claims to be the central ones in Weber's position, but for the sake of completeness, and to at least make it easier for people to assess whether my judgement of 'centrality' is legitimate, two further claims should be added. First, he argued against the practice of social scientists making value-judgements, in their teaching or writing, and for a separation in the practice of social scientists between their scientific, and political or ethical, activities. Above all, as I suggested earlier, he wished to avoid any spuriously scientific authority being given to social scientists' normative pronouncements, and believed this would best be achieved by a separation of 'professional' and 'political' roles. It is important to note, though, that Weber presented this view quite explicitly as a value-judgement, that was not itself scientifically establishable. Second, Weber believed that whilst ethical and political values were of the greatest importance, there was no fully rational way of defending one's commitment to them. He emphasized the diversity and incompatibility of the normative standpoints that people sincerely adopted, and claimed that no knowledge was possible about their final merits. 26 As I shall note later, Weber's position was clearly strongly influenced by a Kantian dualism, as interpreted through the Heidelberg school of neo-Kantians. But before moving to this stage of my overall argument, I turn to examine the logical relationships between the four doctrines outlined so far.
The logical relationships between the four 'positivist' doctrines
I shall proceed here by first making a series of claims about some of these logical relationships, and then providing some examples of the failure to recognize these by certain critics of positivism. think, more plausible from such a standpoint to deny this, and so to regard value-judgements as cognitively meaningless. Now, unless it could be argued that political and moral decisions do not require such judgements, it would follow that these decisions cannot be made scientifically; thus the realm of politics and ethics cannot be brought within the bounds of legitimate knowledge. Far from this leading epistemological positivists to endorse the ideal of a scientific politics, then, it would be more reasonable for them to regard political and moral disputes as rationally unresolvable. Indeed, epistemological positivism might well provide the grounds for challenging any claims made for the scientificity of their views by proponents of substantive normative positions, rather in the way that
Weber did, in his conception of value-free science.
(iii) As for the relation between the positivist conception of science, and the scientization of politics, it should be clear why the former does not entail the latter. For, as I have already argued, it would be consistent to maintain both this view of science, and the possibility of a non-scientific knowledge of values. Thus politics could be rationally based, without thereby having to be 'scientific'. Further, the positivist conception of science is compatible with the doctrine of value-freedom which itself, as we have seen, is directed against the possibility of a scientific politics.
(iii) I turn now to illustrate some ways in which these logical relationships between the various doctrines have been misunderstood or ignored, and the significance of this for the critique of positivism. One of the main features of this critique has been that positivism is unable to provide us with the basis for a rational criticism of existing social reality, one that reveals its inhuman, irrational and repressive character. Positivism, it is argued, confines itself to describing and explaining what exists, and to the extent that it fails to criticize, and to aid in the struggle against, the existing state of affairs, it at least implicitly supports, or contributes to the maintenance of, that state of affairs.
There are a number of difficulties in this argument, but what I wish to focus upon is the question: Empiricism further contends that other aims may be set alongside the will to freedom and that it is not the task of science to decide which of these is right."
Here there is a definite confusion between epistemological positivism, positivist science, and value- I now wish to conclude this paper by offering some rather brief and schematic remarks about the historical relationships between these four doctrines, thereby at least indicating the complexity of this history. Confining myself mainly to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I shall first propose an overall summary of these relationships, looking in turn at the two doctrines I began with, the scientization of politics and the Weberian conception of value-freedom. The 'histories' of these seem distinct in important respects, but are also intertwined through the position of utilitarianism, and display complex relationships to specific political standpoints, such as liberalism, socialism and 'authoritarianism'. (I should emphasize that I make no claims to any expertise in the history of ideas, and what follows is the result of occasional and amateurish reflections and speculations on my part).
The ideal of the scientization of politics -which we find well before the nineteenth century, in writers such as Hobbes, and perhaps also in some of the Enlightenment rationalists 37 -was articulated in the nineteenth century with great energy and crudity by Saint-Simon (often regarded as the first selfproclaimed 'positivist') on the basis of an apparent belief in epistemological positivism, combined with a deeply held commitment to the virtues of science, industry, and a 'scientific outlook'. Whether this combination is philosophically coherent, is dubious, for it could be argued that the advocacy of a scientific approach to social and political questions is not compatible with the belief that only science provides genuine knowledge, since the merits of such an approach are not themselves matters of scientific knowledge. 38 Nonetheless, philosophically more sophisticated thinkers than Saint-Simon have adopted the same combination: for instance, the authors of the Vienna Circle's first 'manifesto'
(interestingly entitled 'The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle'), Neurath, Carnap and Hahn, who declared that: partly also because of the markedly illiberal, authoritarian elements in Comte's politics 42 (present also in Saint-Simon, who claimed, for instance, that "the cultivation of politics will be entrusted exclusively to a special class of scientists who will impose silence on all twaddle"). 43 This last point raises the major issue of the relations between scientific politics, utilitarianism, and the politics of liberalism, socialism and authoritarianism, to which I will return. But for now there is another aspect of Mill's position I want to mention, since it will lead us to a sketch of the second main strand: Weberian value-freedom.
Mill was a staunch defender of the dichotomy between factual and value-judgements (probably here following Hume). 44 And I think it would be reasonable also to ascribe to him So I turn now to this Kantian background to the doctrine of value-freedom. I think it is helpful here to consider some passages from a book published in 1914 by Richard Kroner, Kant's Weltanschauung. 45 Kroner was a member of the Heidelberg school of neo-Kantians, which had as its two best-known figures Windelband and Rickert, both of whom appear to have had an important influence on Weber.
(Lewis White Beck describes this book as "the only presentation in English of the characteristic Heidelberg interpretation of Kant"). 46 Kroner gives the following overall characterization of Kant's philosophy:
"His entire philosophy receives its particular tone from a two-fold insight. On the one hand, along with modern rationalists since Descartes and Galileo, he sees, in the exactitude of mathematical knowledge, the pattern and ideal of all theoretical study of reality; on the other hand, in spite of his full appreciation of scientific truth, he does not accord it any metaphysical significance. Kant is of the opinion that the point of contact between man and the supersensible sphere is to be discerned in the facts of man's moral life, in his selfdetermination, and in the laws of his moral will; for it is on these laws that the dignity and freedom of man rest.... Only mathematical relations are knowable, and they are the objects which the mechanical and physical sciences can successfully treat. The world in which we as moral beings act and pursue our ends obviously cannot be penetrated by mathematical knowledge; therefore this world cannot be grasped in its reality by any theoretical [i.e. scientific -R.K.] means." 47 Kroner later argues that, for Kant, the limitations he places on the scope and character of scientific knowledge are the result of his view that, without these, morality and freedom would not be possible.
Thus:
"If morality is possible at all, the duality of nature and freedom must exist, and its existence must be a limitation of knowledge." 'progressive' politics were, logically speaking, an aberration. 51 Second, in the context of the early nineteenth century, Saint-Simon's 'radicalism' consisted in, amongst other things, attacking the value of political or religious liberties, by associating these with the 'metaphysical' stage of historical development, which was to be replaced by the positive, scientific one. The "lawyers and metaphysicians", he claimed, were at one time a historically progressive group through their role "in modifying the feudal and theological system and ensuring that it did not suppress the scientific and industrial system once it began to develop". But he bemoaned the fact that the French Revolution, in which the leading part 'should' have been taken by "the industrials and the scientists", was instead 'taken over' by the lawyers and metaphysicians. It would, he said, "be superfluous to recall the strange wanderings which resulted, and the misfortunes which resulted from these wanderings." 52 Further:
"The philosophers of the eighteenth century convinced people in general to accept the right of the individual to practice his own religion and to decide which religion his children should be taught."
"The philosophers of the nineteenth century will convince people that all children should study the same code of terrestrial morality, since the similarity of positive moral ideas is the only link which can unite men in society, and since ultimately an improvement of the social condition is nothing more than an improvement in the system of positive morality." 53 I think there are obvious links here between Saint-Simon's attitude towards the 'historical function' of liberal rights, and Marx's view of the redundancy of such rights in communist society: this is one of the points at which the relationships between positivism, Marxism and 'scientific socialism' is so important. 54 But I cannot explore this here. Instead, I will elaborate briefly on an earlier comment, in this section, about J. S. Mill's opposition to the illiberalism of Comte's positivist politics.
It seems possible that a barrier to our recognizing the connections between positivism's illiberal politics, and utilitarianism, is that we (i.e. 'British intellectuals') tend to identify utilitarianism with its expression in J.S. Mill's writings, where we find the most famous defence of individual liberties, such as freedom of speech. Yet, as is often noted, there is a marked tension between the utilitarian and liberal-democratic elements in Mill's philosophy, which emerges, for instance, in the problematic distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures, and in his possibly question-begging attempt to define 'happiness' so as to include the interests of 'man as a progressive being'. One may adopt the view that this tension is indeed unresolved by Mill; or alternatively, point to the somewhat elitist character of some of Mill's political proposals, and the legitimacy he attached to the 'authority' of those with the scientific and intellectual expertise appropriate for making rational decisions involving utilitarian calculations 55 . But whichever view is taken, we should not allow the essay 'On Liberty' to blind us to the conceptual connections between utilitarianism and the apparent 'authoritarianism' of Saint-Simonian positivism. (Whether such authoritarianism can coherently be criticized from a nonliberal Marxism, or from a scientific socialism, is another matter.)
My final set of comments concern the Vienna Circle. I quoted earlier from its 'manifesto', which seems to reveal a much stronger link with early French positivism and a scientific politics than we would expect on the basis of how logical positivism has usually been presented and discussed, at least within British philosophy. My guess is that this results from the fact that it has been primarily through Here, the links between 'hedonism' and 'positivist sociology' are taken up in an attempt to show the Epicurean and scientific bases of Marxist socialism. Thus Neurath argues that "Marxism is, consciously, the philosophy of the socialist proletariat and promises it happiness" 58 ; that Marx "teaches the decline of the bourgeois order and the coming of the socialist order"; 59 and that "it is precisely the proletariat that is the bearer of science without metaphysics". 60 Here we see that same (and perhaps philosophically indefensible) combination of epistemological positivism, utilitarianism and scientific politics that was evident in the early French positivists, allied now with socialism. But, as I have argued throughout this paper, it is not a combination that justifies critics of positivism in their attempts to show that uncritical acceptance of the existing order is implied by the positivist conception of science; and it is clearly a set of views that is both logically and historically distinct from the philosophical foundations of the doctrine of value-freedom that we find in Max Weber.
